The ability to train talented officials, Chinese leader Xi Jinping once said, “largely determines the rise and fall, as well as the survival or demise” of political parties and countries. After a major reshuffle of ministerial posts in March, the government’s main news agency Xinhua recalled Xi’s words in an article that sought to show how rigorous the selection process had been. However, since late June, two of the highest-ranking officials promoted during that shake-up have disappeared: first Qin Gang. , the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and more recently General Li Shangfu, the Minister of Defense. The speed of their apparent demise is striking. The questions they raise about Chinese politics are great.
There are no signs that this is an existential moment for the Communist Party, or for Mr Xi’s rule. The admiration for Xi continues unabated in the state media. He stayed away from the G20 summit in Delhi on September 9 and 10 – an unprecedented absence. But on September 16 and 17, Wang Yi, who succeeded Qin as foreign minister in late July, met with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Malta. According to Bloomberg, they discussed a possible meeting between Xi and President Joe Biden at a meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders scheduled for November in San Francisco. China’s military activities also appear to be unaffected. On September 17 and 18, about 100 Chinese fighter jets flew around Taiwan, an unusually high number for such a time frame.
But turnover at the highest levels of the state and military apparatus has been unusually rapid, even by the standards of Xi’s purge-filled tenure. General Li has not been seen in public since August 29, when he appeared at a China-Africa security forum. He was scheduled to attend an annual meeting with Vietnamese defense officials on September 7 and 8. But that plan was scrapped, with Chinese officials citing the general’s health. Unspecified illnesses seem to be a common problem for people in political trouble. It was said that Mr. Qin also had a health problem. But according to the Wall Street Journal, senior Chinese officials were secretly told last month that he was having “lifestyle problems.” They are said to have had an extramarital affair, resulting in the birth of a child, while Mr Qin was ambassador to Washington before becoming a foreigner. minister.
Official websites indicate no change in General Li’s duties. But US and other officials have told Western media they believe he has been removed from office. Reuters reported that he was suspected of corruption related to the procurement of military equipment, which General Li oversaw from 2017 to 2022. The news agency said eight senior officials from the procurement department were also under investigation.
There is also speculation that bribery is a reason for the late July replacement (announced in state media) of General Li Yuchao and General Xu Zhongbo. They were the top two commanders of the Rocket Force, which controls China’s nuclear and conventional missiles. General Li Yuchao only took charge last year. A less high-profile but equally unusual personnel change came to light on September 1 with the resignation of Major General Cheng Dongfang as president of the People’s Liberation Army Military Court after just eight months in office. No reason was given. General Cheng previously served as spokesperson for the Chinese military garrison in Hong Kong.
On Chinese social media, censorship has suppressed most discussion. Only one reaction is visible on the post of a user with more than 670,000 followers who alluded to the absence of the Minister of Defense. “Aren’t you afraid that your account will be closed?” it says. “Don’t talk about him.” But given Xi’s efforts to portray China’s political system as a more stable and effective alternative to liberal democracy, the purges have yielded rich harvests for his foreign critics. On Later he offered another literary analogy: ‘As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, ‘Something is rotten in the world. state of Denmark’.”
To be fair, the posts of Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs in China are not as crucial as they often are in other countries. Neither General Li nor Mr Qin are among the 24 members of the Politburo, the pinnacle of political power. But ministerial duties include defending the country’s interests abroad. (In China’s eyes, Mr. Qin’s alleged behavior may have made him a security risk.) And the purges raise questions about Mr. Xi’s ability to select the right talent and his ability to scare officials into avoid corruption.
The actions targeted people who were clearly Xi’s men. Qin’s elevation to foreign minister was unusually quick, suggesting he may have impressed Xi during his stint as chief organizer of his foreign trips. He was promoted to the party’s Central Committee last year and was given the additional title of State Councilor (a senior role in China’s Cabinet) in March. Only four others hold that rank, including General Li. The defense minister is also a member of the Central Committee and one of six officers working under Xi in the armed forces’ governing body, the Central Military Commission.
Team without rivals
General Li and Qin were among many people close to Xi who benefited from the March reshuffle and another last October involving party jobs. The overhaul produced a ruling team that seemed more aligned with the supreme leader than at any time since the era of Mao Zedong. In China, questions will certainly be asked (in whispers) about how stable it is.
But Mr. Xi must be used to mumbling. His previous purges have affected hundreds of thousands of officials, both high and low, including many in the services most vital to maintaining the party’s grip on power: the armed forces, the police and the spy apparatus. Many of the fallen have been accused of corruption, but some also of political misconduct. Last September, courts imposed lengthy prison sentences on several security chiefs accused of being corrupt, as well as on members of a disloyal cabal. They included a former Deputy Minister of Public Security and a former Minister of Justice. In 2015, Zhou Yongkang – a retired head of China’s domestic security services and former member of the Politburo Standing Committee – was sentenced to life in prison for bribery and leaking state secrets. Xi accused him and other jailed associates of trying to “seize power.”
If General Li Shangfu is replaced, as observers expect, there could be an advantage for America. Last August, in response to a visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, China halted regular talks between the two countries’ defense establishments. America is eager to restart them and sees them as useful for discussing ways to avoid accidental collisions. But while working in procurement, General Li was placed under US sanctions in 2018 for buying fighter jets and missiles from Russia. China wants sanctions lifted before talks resume. Removing the man himself could break an impasse.
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