The downfall of General Li Yuchao, the commander of China’s Rocket Force, and his political commissar, General Xu Zhongbo, affects Xi more directly. He put them in charge of China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missiles. No reason was given when official media announced on July 31 that they had been replaced. There was also no indication as to their fate, although there is speculation that General Li and other Rocket Force officials may be under investigation for corruption or leaking military secrets.
Whatever the reason, their premature removal confirms the biggest clean-up of the military leadership in almost a decade. This suggests that Xi’s efforts to reform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may face more obstacles than previously thought. It is also the latest example of his own appointees getting into trouble, which some see as a sign of his own misjudgment and divisions within the elite. Last month, Qin Gang, who was given the post by Xi in December, was just as suddenly dismissed as foreign minister.
Xi’s supporters could argue that he is injecting new momentum into two of his signature domestic initiatives: an anti-corruption drive and a program to transform the PLA into a modern fighting force. They could also argue that he is demonstrating a commendable resistance to cronyism by not shielding his protégés. Yet the sudden size and scale of the upheaval, the lack of a clear explanation and the persistent rumors of further scandals all reflect poorly on his leadership and indicate an unusual degree of unrest in the centers of power.
The changes to the Rocket Force surprised many PLA experts because the service has been a priority for Mr. Xi in recent years. “If there’s one agency you want to be absolutely incorruptible, it would be the one that controls nuclear missiles,” says Timothy Heath of the RAND Corporation, an American think tank. “Clearly there is something going on that is making Xi Jinping feel uneasy about his fellow elites.”
The Rocket Force, previously known as the PLA Second Artillery Corps, was renamed and upgraded in 2015. It became a separate service with equal status to the army, navy and air force, reflecting its growing importance to Mr Xi’s military ambitions. Another signal came in 2018, when the former commander, General Wei Fenghe, was promoted to defense minister. He was the only person without a military background to hold this position.
The Rocket Force now oversees the largest arsenal of land-based missiles in the world. This includes hundreds of conventional cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, many of which are designed to target US ships in a possible war over Taiwan. This includes most of China’s estimated 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 400 nuclear warheads, according to the Pentagon’s latest annual report on China’s armed forces.
The Rocket Force’s share of China’s military budget is also believed to have grown rapidly. According to the Pentagon, in recent years it has been central to an upgrade of China’s nuclear arsenal, which is unprecedented in size and complexity. It predicts that China could have as many as 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 – the deadline Mr Xi has set for the “fundamental modernization” of the PLA.
Although there is no public evidence to date that funds from this program have been misused, large military spending schemes have often enabled embezzlement, kickbacks and other forms of corruption. The background of the new Rocket Force commander, General Wang Houbin, and the new political commissioner, General Xu Xisheng, also suggests that Mr Xi is using outsiders to disrupt patronage networks in the service. General Wang has spent his entire career so far in the Navy, while General Xu has previously only served in the Air Force.
“To drop both the commander and the political commissar at the same time could be a first. And then to replace them with outsiders is really telling,” said Brendan Mulvaney of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, a US Air Force think tank. “There’s probably some deep rot at the top of the Rocket Force, but I have no idea if it’s money, women, secrets, or some combination thereof.”
Mr. Mulvaney noted that General Xu, who as political commissar is responsible for enforcing ideology and party discipline, is a full member of the party’s central committee. He therefore has a higher political status than General Wang, who is not a member of the body. That underlines the message that the party retains ultimate authority over the PLA, which is technically its armed wing and not a national force, as in most other countries.
There are indications that the Rocket Force’s problems extend to other current and former officers. Recent, albeit unconfirmed, reports indicate that at least one former deputy commander is under investigation and another committed suicide in early July. There is even speculation that the problems may be related to General Wei, the former Rocket Force commander who resigned as defense minister in March.
The unrest may also be linked to recent changes in the operations of the Rocket Force, which is now on regular alert, requiring its troops to be ready to mount nuclear warheads on missiles, said Phillip Saunders of the US National Defense University. These and other recent changes suggest that China is turning away from its long-standing “no first use” policy — to launch nuclear weapons only after it has sustained a nuclear attack — toward a “launch on warning,” where it would fire them as soon as it occurs. incoming nuclear missiles detected.
“That places a large premium on the political loyalty and reliability of Rocket Force commanders in the field. And if the force is corrupt and people are paying for promotions, that’s a breach of political responsibility,” Saunders said. If military secrets have indeed been leaked, he adds, “that could mean that there are people who cannot do that. can be trusted within the nuclear chain of command. That would be a very serious issue.”
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© 2023, The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved. From The Economist, published under license. Original content can be found at www.economist.com
