In the aftermath of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed uprising, the Russian leadership seems to be living in an alternate reality.
The sequence of events speaks for itself. Russian troops swung through Wagner columns on their way to Moscow, and curious citizens greeted them in the street with snacks; President Vladimir Putin revised this vision as a united Russian society. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu hid out of sight while his subordinates talked to Mr. Prigozhin; he emerged days later to praise officers for their loyalty. One of Russia’s most experienced generals, Sergei Surovikin, was filmed in a nondescript room asking Wagner to resign; he has not been seen since, while Russia’s incompetent military leadership team remains in place. The strangest thing is that Mr. Prigozhin – the architect of it all – goes back and forth between his impersonality and apparent meeting with Mr. Putin to smooth over differences.
It’s been a strange few weeks. But on the ground, the Russian war effort continues as before. During the brief uprising, operations continued as planned and the chain of command held up. There were no signs of mass refusals, desertions or mutinies. For now, Russia’s defensive positions – stretching from Belgorod in the east to Crimea in the south – are still secure.
But for how long? The problems inherent in the Russian campaign in Ukraine are likely to worsen. Mr. Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top officer, will continue to wage the war incompetently. Held by Putin for their loyalty, they will now be even more inclined to suppress negative information and give a distorted view of the war. Cleanup in the military, seemingly underway, will only add to the dysfunction. For the sake of notoriety, the Kremlin has chosen to amplify failure.
Whatever his fate after the failed uprising, Mr. Prigozhin’s criticisms of the war are still dangerous – because they are correct. He repeatedly pointed out, in foul, angry language, how the war is being mismanaged at the highest levels by unreachable bureaucrats, leading to many logistical problems and ammunition shortages. He criticized Mr. Shoigu and General Gerasimov for downplaying bad news and deceiving Mr. Putin as he engages in petty intrigues with subordinates. He noted how the children of Russia’s elite evade military service as the poor return home in coffins.
But Putin’s cocoon of loyal interlocutors filters out these problems and instead offers a substitute vision to both the president and an unengaged public. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy head of Russia’s National Security Council, says 185,000 men will have joined the Russian army by 2023 alone. The Department of Defense claims to have destroyed more than that twice as much HIMARS trucks as ever delivered to Ukraine. As Mr. Shoigu says, “Everything is going according to plan.” None of this is true.
General Surovikin’s disappearance is a more telling sign of the state of affairs. Known for his focus and ruthless tactics — including razing cities in Syria and Ukraine — he took command of Russia’s armed forces last fall and ordered the construction of Russia’s extensive defensive positions. (They are popularly known as the Surovikin Lines.) He was soon relegated in favor of General Gerasimov, who launched an ineffective and costly winter offensive within weeks of assuming command. General Surovikin, a decorated veteran of four wars with cachet among military, veteran and blogger communities, looked all the wiser by comparison. Now rumors are circulating about his detention as punishment for his long-standing ties to Mr. Prigozhin and possible knowledge of the uprising. The delay in information on his whereabouts suggests the Kremlin is still deciding how to proceed.
In this atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty, where prominent generals disappear and Putin is quick to blame traitors, self-censorship among top military leaders is likely to become more common. Mr. Shoigu and General Gerasimov, now even more dependent on Mr. Putin for their security and positions, would be more likely to hide or soften bad news from the battlefield to maintain his confidence. That would further undermine the Kremlin’s grip on the true state of the war at a crucial moment in the conflict.
Things are not going well on the Russian front lines. It is still not clear whether Wagner forces will withdraw completely from Ukraine. If they leave, regular military units will inflict more casualties at a time when they can hardly afford more casualties. The Russian army has already lost half its combat strength, according to the head of the British armed forces, and may not have the strength to hold out against the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. Some front-line units, crouched in their defensive positions, have little rest and lack sufficient reserves to relieve them. Regular Ukrainian attacks on ammunition depots, logistics hubs and command posts make everything more difficult. At least two generals have recently been fired for complaining about these intolerable conditions.
All this could create an opening for Ukrainian forces to exploit if they have the means. But they too are having a hard time. Subjected to sustained artillery attacks and without sufficient air support, they struggle to cut through dense Russian minefields. Their combat engineers now manually clear mines – extremely dangerous and painstaking work. When Ukrainian troops have reached Russian trenches, they have often been able to clear them. The cluster munitions recently sent by the United States should also help.
For now, the Russian front lines are holding out despite the Kremlin’s dysfunctional decisions. Yet the cumulative pressure of bad choices is increasing. The Russian front lines could crack in the way Hemingway once wrote about going bankrupt: “gradually, then suddenly.”
Dara Massicot (@MassDara) is a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation and a former analyst of Russian military capabilities at the United States Department of Defense.
