China's dislike of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te is no secret. Chinese authorities call him a stubborn, confrontational “separatist” who may provoke war in the Taiwan Strait. But since Lai's election in May, it is China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) that has increased the chances of conflict by deploying more aircraft and naval vessels around Taiwan. “The PLA is using an 'anaconda strategy' to put pressure on the island,” said Admiral Tang Hua, Taiwan's naval commander.
In an interview with The Economist, Admiral Tang (pictured) warns that Chinese forces are “slowly but surely” increasing their presence in his country. “They are willing to block Taiwan whenever they want,” he said. His concerns are supported by the data. The number of PLA airstrikes across the median line, the de facto border in the middle of the Taiwan Strait, has increased more than fivefold, from 36 in January to 193 in August. The number of PLA ships operating around Taiwan has also risen steadily, from 142 in January to 282 in August. These ships are also moving closer to Taiwan, along the contiguous zone, or 24 nautical miles offshore. And according to the Taiwanese navy commander, they have been patrolling for a few days straight, compared to just a few hours earlier.
These are relatively new developments. Until August 2022, the PLA operated mainly in southern and western Taiwan, around the Bashi Channel between the island and the Philippines. Taiwan's rugged east coast, home to aircraft hangars built beneath mountains, was seen as safer and more difficult to reach from China. But that changed after a visit to the island that year by Nancy Pelosi, a senior US official at the time. The trip infuriated China and shortly afterwards the PLA carried out a mock blockade near eastern Taiwan. That sent a signal that the region was no longer safe. Now the PLA has normalized patrols there and regularly encircles the island by sea and air. It has also increased the number of naval transits via the Yonaguni Canal between Taiwan and Japan.
Few people in Taiwan are aware of how close and regular the PLA patrols are. Since 2020, Taiwan's Ministry of Defense has published daily updates on air activities around the island, including maps of the locations of Chinese warplanes. In 2022, it added updates on the number of PLA Navy ships operating “around Taiwan.” But it doesn't specify what types of ships, where they go or for how long. The government may be concerned that too much disclosure would damage public morale or Taiwan's economy, Admiral Tang said.
The PLA's increased patrols are putting pressure on the Taiwanese Navy. China has twice as many frigates and ten times as many destroyers. According to Cheng-kun Ma and Tristan Tan, a pair of Taiwanese defense researchers, Taiwan often has to deploy 25 to 50% of its combat ships to match Chinese patrols. “They give you extreme pressure, pressure, pressure. They are trying to wear you down,” said Admiral Tang. A government audit found that more than half of Taiwan's major warships had fallen behind on regular maintenance.
As the PLA Navy moves closer to the island, Taiwan is focusing on avoiding confrontation. “The PLA is trying to force Taiwan to make mistakes,” says Admiral Tang, and is looking for “excuses” to unleash a blockade. That is why Taiwan's military leaders this year issued new rules defining the ethical and legal use of force in self-defense: “We restrain our boys, not to provoke or escalate.”
Even as Taiwan's military forces exercise restraint, leaders are working with allies on how to keep maritime lines of communication open in the event of a blockade. Taiwan is also seeking international help to resist Chinese pressure. The Japanese Navy conducted its first transit exercise through the Taiwan Strait in September, as did naval vessels from Australia, New Zealand and Germany. The US Navy sails through it several times a year. The exercises send a signal to China that the strait is international territory. The Chinese authorities protest. But they show no sign of easing the anaconda's pressure.
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