As America and other long-standing powers tell it: China has unique leverage over the region's biggest troublemakers, starting with Iran, and an unusual need for stability in the Middle East. China is the world's largest importer of both oil and liquefied natural gas, purchasing large quantities from both Iran and Arab countries. It is a major regional investor, with tens of billions of dollars at stake in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
As the world's largest manufacturer, China is exceptionally exposed to spikes in global shipping costs. That's a painful distinction when drone and missile attacks by Iranian-armed Houthi rebels in Yemen have all but closed the Red Sea and Suez Canal to container ships, sending Chinese exports to Europe via a costly detour around Africa.
With these arguments in hand, the Biden administration and other Western governments have spent months asking China to lean on Iran and the Houthis. In meetings with Western officials, Chinese diplomats are equivocal, pointing to messages passed to Iran while downplaying their influence in Tehran, and questioning whether Iran has much influence over the Houthis. Instead of sending People's Liberation Army (PLA) warships to join an American-led military coalition that has escorted civilian ships and attacked Houthi radar and missile sites, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi , noted that US and British attacks in Yemen do not provide UN security. Council approval.
In late July, the leaders of Fatah and Hamas, the rival Palestinian factions, met in Beijing for unity talks that Mr. Wang called “an important historic moment.” Others were more skeptical, noting that the resulting Beijing Declaration, signed by Fatah, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian groups, left unresolved the thorniest questions, such as who should control security in post-war Gaza.
In Beijing, Western diplomats are muttering that China's leaders have no illusions about their ability to solve the Middle East puzzle, but see an easy victory in playing the peacemaker. Meanwhile, China knows that its calls for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and its outspoken support for a Palestinian state align with the positions of most countries, especially those in the Global South. The most cynical Western voices suggest that while China would certainly prefer a quieter world, the current disarray will at least keep US aircraft carriers and diplomatic envoys usefully tied up in the Middle East, rather than causing trouble in China's backyard.
For scholars of China's foreign policy and security establishment, such a Western analysis is lamentably crude. “How many US troops can the Houthis tie down in the Red Sea? Not much, that's too simple,” said Hu Bo, professor of maritime security at Beijing University. Yes, Chinese exporters are facing higher costs now that the Red Sea is closed, but there is no evidence that their losses are “unbearable.” In the absence of a UN mandate, even escorting ships in the Red Sea “implies that China is against the Houthis, or against Iran,” the professor says, and endangers China's preferred stance of neutrality in the Middle East. The crisis is “not on China's doorstep,” so the Chinese ask: “Why should we help the United States solve this problem?”
Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel of the PLA, chides Western governments for arguing that China, as the world's largest trading power, should be willing to attack Houthi targets or pressure Iran in the name of maintaining freedom of navigation on the high seas. . The root cause of the crisis is “because Israelis are bombing and killing in Gaza,” he says. The Houthis have said that Chinese-flagged ships are not their targets, he added, and that most Chinese cargoes are already sailing around the Cape of Good. Hope, now at Tsinghua University's Center for International Security and Strategy, warns that frigates and destroyers – the warships the PLA would send – have limited air defense. What, he asks, would be the purpose of such ships entering the Red Sea and firing at the Houthis? For China putting pressure on Iran: “The point is at what cost would you use your influence?”
An executive at a multinational in China goes one step further. He argues that “we should be very careful about assessing the disruption as bad for China.” As the Covid-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on supply chains and trucking markets, Chinese companies quickly adapted and grabbed business from slower rivals, he notes. “China prefers stability, but when there is chaos, they think opportunistically and not defensively.”
China doesn't need help calculating its interests
Mr. Zhou sees “a grain of truth” in such arguments. He notes that Chinese companies operate in volatile regions of Africa and the Middle East, where it is difficult to make profits. Unlike Western companies that need quick returns, Chinese companies will endure hardship. to capture market share, he suggests. The goal is to survive the competition and reap the rewards later. He draws a comparison to the Long March of 1934-35, when Red Army troops crossed snowy mountains, rapid rivers and deadly swamps during China's civil war. war, knowing that their enemy, the larger, better armed nationalist army, would not follow them.
To a striking degree, today's Chinese diplomats are maneuvering like Red Army guerrillas, carefully avoiding crises that could trap and ensnare China while achieving quick, flashy victories. China is a superpower with global interests. But it is led by the same Communist Party that survived the Long March by fighting battles and organizing strategic withdrawals. Remember, history and Chinese opportunism make more sense.
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