The G20 Summit has snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, thanks to its success in issuing the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration. There were fears that, as with the G20 meetings of Foreign, Finance and Development Ministers, which failed to produce joint statements due to disagreements over the conflict in Ukraine (in both cases a chairman’s summary was issued by India), the Top would not succeed in creating a consensus document. Fortunately, this pessimism has been belied.
Russia, backed by China, had already rejected the repetition of the compromise language on the war in Ukraine in the Bali Leaders’ Declaration under the Indonesian presidency in 2022. The West’s position has been hardened in recent times by increasing financial support and arms supplies to Ukraine, including cluster bombs, uranium-enriched munitions and advanced missiles to enable the country to launch its so-called spring offensive to gain the military upper hand and destroy Russia. to come and sit at the peace table. Against this background, it seemed highly unlikely that these fundamental differences over the conflict in Ukraine could be bridged and that compromise language could be drafted to allow for a joint statement.
It is a credit to New Delhi’s diplomacy, buoyed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s international stature, that India could help forge a language of compromise on the conflict in Ukraine. In this effort, the weight of the Global South has been a crucial element, in that Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa, the past and future presidents of the G20, and heavyweights of the Global South, brokered the language, also supported by Mexico and Turkey. Neither the G7 Plus members of the G20, nor Russia and China, which have major interests in the South, could have rejected these efforts.
The G20 platform, created by the G7, was intended to facilitate major developing countries in decision-making on economic and financial matters at the international level. The G7 would want to maintain this platform, in which they have a major say, rather than diminish its relevance if the Delhi Summit had ended without a consensus document. The recent expansion of the BRICS to the G11, with further expansions in the pipeline, excludes the G7, thereby sidelining its influence and control over the agenda. This move was strategically aimed at challenging established Western global dominance. It was an important factor taken into account to ensure that the G20 summit did not end in disagreement.
It is therefore not surprising that Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor, called the statement an “important milestone” and “a vote of confidence that the G20 can come together to address an urgent set of issues”.
The US undoubtedly also had its own bilateral ties with India in mind when conducting the summit. One would have kept in mind that, in the context of India and the US forging ever closer ties, it would be a blow to India and to Prime Minister Modi personally if the US-led G7 allowed the summit to be held in an inconclusive way would end. For India, the G20 Presidency was an opportunity to showcase a new, confident, economically emerging India determined to play a more active role in shaping a new international order that is more democratic and just and also a bridge remains between East and West. as North and South. The constructive role played by the G7 leaders in contributing to the success of the summit, leaders with whom Modi has built productive ties, must be recognized.
Russia, which has sought to isolate the West diplomatically, is successfully reaching out to the South, especially African countries. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, has also made tremendous inroads into the Global South to position itself as a rival to the US in terms of global power. Both Russia and China, also with the South’s growing attraction to the BRICS, would also have responded to pressure from developing countries to reach compromise language on Ukraine.
In order to secure the language of consensus, the G7 ultimately gave up a lot of ground to the conflict in Ukraine, compared to the language in the Bali Declaration. The document does not refer to Russia by name at all. There is no mention of “deploring in the strongest terms Russian aggression against Ukraine” or reference to “Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from Ukrainian territory,” as in the Bali Declaration. The war in Ukraine has also been placed in the broader context of “the immense suffering and negative consequences of wars and conflicts around the world”.
The addition in the Delhi Declaration that “all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force in pursuit of territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any State” is a general statement of principle that, Even though this indirectly refers to Russian action in Ukraine, Russia could sympathize, especially since it claims that the principle of self-determination, enshrined in the UN Charter, is at stake in Ukraine and that the Ukrainian territories in question have been Russia have been annexed.
Some elements of the Bali Declaration were reincorporated into the Delhi Declaration, again in terms of general principles, such as “the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is not permissible”. Russia did not oppose this formulation in Bali either. Russia did not object when this was said in the China-EU document. That “there were different views and assessments of the situation” regarding the impact of the war in Ukraine is reiterated from the Bali Declaration. This is language that suits Russia, but the omission of the word “sanctions” in this sentence was clearly a concession to the G7 which believes its sanctions are justified.
On the controversial issue of exports of food grains and fertilizers from the region (the Black Sea Initiative), which Russia has suspended, Russia has gained satisfaction as the Declaration calls for full and timely implementation of the UN-mediated Istanbul Agreements to ensure “the immediate and unimpeded supplies of grain, foodstuffs and fertilizers/inputs from the Russian Federation and Ukraine” necessary to meet demand in developing and least developed countries, especially in Africa. Russia has argued that, in contrary to the agreement in question, Russian agricultural exports by the West are hampered by various forms of sanctions. It is clear that in the drafting of this text the weight of the Global South has been felt.
The Declaration’s call to welcome all relevant and constructive initiatives that support comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, in addition to upholding the principles of the UN Charter for the promotion of peaceful, friendly and good neighborly relations among nations in spirit from “One Earth, One Family, One Future”, is a bow to India.
(Kanwal Sibal was foreign minister and ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and deputy chief of mission in Washington.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author.