Over the past 30 years, Ukraine has made great strides in its experimentation with democracy. Despite troubling cases of government-backed corruption – undeniably, there is still more work to be done – Ukraine made hard-fought progress on reform during the war. Six presidents, two revolutions and many violent protests later have sent the people of Ukraine a clear message that reflects the most fundamental American values: they will fight for basic rights and against authoritarian repression.
A prosperous Ukraine, backed by US support, makes an authoritarian Russia unsustainable in the long run. Ukraine’s success would negate Russia’s irredentist aspirations for empire and highlight the Kremlin’s failures, much as West Germany’s achievements once compared with the totalitarian East German state during the Cold War. It may even convince the Russian people – who share a culture, history and religion with Ukrainians – to eventually demand their own framework for democratic transition.
Of course, this doesn’t happen overnight. Realizing such a vision requires a generational investment. Nevertheless, the contours of the stark contrast between a prosperous democratic Ukraine and a repressive and economically stagnant Russia are already clear. This is in large part why Mr Putin needs Ukraine as a failed state.
US support for Ukraine could also help drive a wedge between China and Russia. Preventing Putin from invading Ukraine shows the strength of the West’s commitment to resisting autocracy and makes Russia a less powerful partner to China in their mutual efforts to undermine the Western rules-based international order.
To that end, the United States should consider a division-level military deployment to Eastern Europe to reassure allies and bolster the defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This kind of deployment would signal that Russia’s aggression will result in the kind of NATO security posture Russia would prefer to avoid.
And the United States cannot adequately support Ukraine without significant European involvement. The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s NATO membership a central point of discussion. That’s a distraction at this point, because an assurance that Ukraine won’t be part of NATO, by itself, probably won’t prevent Russia from still trying to trap Ukraine.
The main point to consider is that the negotiations with Russia should be conducted at the level of European security. These talks should lead to off-ramps that alleviate both European and Russian security concerns: for Russia, NATO’s encroachment and ballistic missile defense, and for NATO, Russia’s over-militarized western border.