The simplest working definition is that it covers most, but not quite all, non-Western countries. Its use also indicates that emerging economies want more power over global affairs and often take a critical view of Western policies. For example, the global South is said to be outraged by the war in Gaza and dissatisfied with Western decisions on Ukraine, Covid-19 and climate policy. Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a US think tank, says that “the Global South exists less as a coherent, organized group than as a geopolitical fact.”
If the Global South roughly exists, who is leading it? Narendra Modi has suggested that India could be his 'voice'. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula), the president of Brazil, thinks his country could be too. To investigate this question, we worked with a group of scientists to answer this question. Data on trade, financial and diplomatic ties Our conclusion is, counterintuitively, that America still has more influence than any other country in the Global South, but within the grouping itself China has become the most powerful member, making Xi the strongest claim has been received. The trouble is that China's influence has glaring limits and could even have a counterproductive effect. And other powers are on the rise.
We partnered with the Pardee Center for International Futures (PCIF) at the University of Denver. It has created an index of the power of states from 1960 to 2022. The main measure is known as 'formal bilateral influence capacity', a measure of how much power country A can have over country B, based on two dimensions. bandwidth”, or the size of connections back and forth: the volume of trade, diplomatic representation, etc. Second, “dependency”: how much country B needs country A's weapons, loans, investments, etc. . connections mean more opportunities for country A to exert influence – and asymmetry in power makes it easier to do so. Consider China's power over Pakistan, for example: there are plenty of connections and China enjoys asymmetrical influence the approximately 130 members of the Global South who appear in the G77, a UN grouping.
America has been the country with the most influence on the G77 since the 1970s (see graph). Its 'power of influence' has remained more or less constant, even as the appeal of Britain and France has waned. But the country is increasingly being rivaled by China, which saw its influence grow from around 2000 after forty years of relative insignificance. China's “influence capacity” at the G77 is roughly double that of France, the third most influential country, and about three times that of Britain, India or the UAE.
Seeing red
China has the most influence in 31 countries. Its influence is greatest in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia and several states in Southeast Asia. In contrast, India is the second most powerful member of the Global South, with only six G77 members. According to a previous analysis by PCIF, the number of countries in which China had more influence than America almost doubled between 1992 and 2020, from 33 to 61.
Recently, China has become much more enthusiastic about the whole idea of the grouping. Last year, Mr. in favor of expressions such as “family of developing countries”. In September, China published proposals on changing international institutions, rules and laws. It claimed that this was a vision of 'true multilateralism', with 'universal security' replacing 'universal values' – in other words, a system not run by a meddling West.
China is very strategic in gaining influence and targets swing states with infrastructure support, financing and more. From 2000 to 2021, it financed more than 20,000 infrastructure projects, many under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 165 countries with aid or credit worth $1.3 trillion. Some analysts have noted data showing that lending from major state-backed lenders, such as the Export-Import Bank of China, is drying up. But an article published in November by AidData, a group at the College of William & Mary, argues otherwise. “Contrary to conventional wisdom, Beijing is not in retreat,” said Bradley Parks, one of the authors. The article shows that today there are many more entities providing loans to developing countries: in 2021 it amounted to a loan of 80 billion dollars per year. “[China] remains the world's largest source of international development finance.”
China focuses on geopolitical fences. AidData estimates that about two-thirds of Chinese funding goes to “toss-up” countries, where neither China nor America has a clear upper hand. The group has identified a quid pro quo: If a government increases its share of votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on par with China's by ten percentage points, an average increase in funding from Beijing of 276 % to expect. China has also used its weight to curry favor on issues such as repression in Xinjiang “Low- and middle-income countries” voted with China on foreign policy decisions in the UNGA 75% of the time.
China also uses other instruments. It is the most important trading partner of more than 120 countries. It has provided $240 billion in emergency financing of the kind the IMF specializes in, largely since 2016. China is also rapidly building infrastructure projects in developing countries to appease their elites, and subsidizes the rollout of digital technology like Huawei's. Over the past five years, the country has overtaken Russia as the main source of weapons for sub-Saharan Africa.
Although China's leading position within the G77 is formidable, the country faces challenges. First, its influence is limited in reach and intensity. For example, recent polls in Africa and Southeast Asia show divided support for America and China in the developing world.
China's behavior and political values may hinder its influence. Her actions in business and politics have led to calls for accountability, with countries sometimes blaming their debt crises on themselves. And the country's disdain for values-based interactions (it instead preaches non-interference) is clearly visible. Most of the one-party state's closest friends are also autocratic. Places in the Global South where democratic values are considered strong, such as Brazil, are unlikely to have close cultural ties to China. In fact, as China moves closer to countries like Iran and Russia, it risks allying with countries that seek to destroy rather than reform the international order.
Meanwhile, China's economic reputation could deteriorate. The public support it gained through its lending occurred before the money had to be repaid. About 75% of BRI loans must have their principal repaid by 2030. It is probably no coincidence that the share of people in Africa who view China as a positive influence on development has fallen from 59% to 49% since 2019. until 2022, according to Afrobarometer, a pollster. Xi's latest response to China's economic woes is to launch massive industrial subsidies, which could lead to manufactured goods flooding the markets of other emerging economies. While some consumers may benefit, another “China shock” could hamper the industrial ambitions of governments in the Global South.
Even as China faces headwinds, new rivals are emerging whose influence is growing in the Global South. India is the leader. The number of Indian embassies in Africa increased from 25 to 43 between 2012 and 2022. According to Modi, it is the continent's fourth-largest trading partner and fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment. Meanwhile, India is also offering its 'stack' of digital platforms – including biometric identity technology – to countries such as Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.
Some of India's power cannot be quantified. As a flawed democracy with an ultra-pragmatic foreign policy (it has forged closer ties with America while refusing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine), it is closer to the median G77 worldview than China. India's leadership position is also substantively different. . concerned about a China-led Asia than an American-led world, the country is also pragmatic about its approach to reforming international rules. The country wants to be a bridge to the West and not a battering ram.
Buyer's remorse
Other countries have specialist claims to power. If China is an influential supermarket, then its rivals in the Global South are like boutiques, offering other members a smaller range of tailor-made goods. Gulf countries are investing some of their hydrocarbon windfalls in renewable energy projects and mines in the developing world. Brazil, the world's second-largest agricultural exporter, is using its G20 presidency this year to promote food security in the Global South. South Africa, improbably, sees itself as the moral leader of the global south, taking Israel to the International Court of Justice over alleged genocide in Gaza, and leading a “peace mission” of African countries to Ukraine and Russia.
Finally, America and its allies have not disappeared from the game. The rich countries of the OECD group spend more than $200 billion annually on foreign aid (loans make up the bulk of Chinese financing). According to IMF data, trade between sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas and the eurozone overall is greater than that between the region and China. And in addition to alliances like NATO, America has defense partnerships with 76 countries.
China hopes to beat this competition. But even if it does, it will be the leading force in a group that will never be cohesive. China will not permanently welcome India to the UN Security Council; Brazil and South Africa regularly disagree on agriculture within the WTO; Debtor countries and creditors like China want different things than the reforms of the World Bank and the IMF. China will find that countries in the Global South will pursue their national interests and often find themselves in conflict with the West, China – and each other. In other words, the global south does not want a leader. It's a battle zone. Just not one that can be found on a map.
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