Since October, the Islamic Republic's proxy militias in Syria and Iraq have carried out more than 160 attacks on US forces. Some were harmless – more theater than threat – but not the one on January 28, which killed three American soldiers at a base in northeastern Jordan. The Houthis, an Iranian-backed militia in Yemen, have been waging a months-long campaign of missile and drone attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, blocking a waterway that handles perhaps 30% of the world's container trade.
America is starting to strike back. On February 3, it bombed more than 85 targets in Iraq and Syria, the first round of what Joe Biden, the US president, promised would be a multi-phase response to the drone strike in Jordan. It hit the Houthis the next day and again on February 5. Two days later, a US strike in Baghdad killed a leader of Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq. Yet attacks by Iranian allies continue.
Biden's aggressive critics think they know why: American threats are not credible because America is not prepared to attack Iran itself. They point to Operation Praying Mantis, during the “tanker wars” of the 1980s, in which America sank five Iranian warships and destroyed two of its oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.
Critics on the left make a different argument. They view talk of deterrence as misplaced belligerence and instead offer what they say is a simple solution: end the war in Gaza. If Israel stops killing Palestinians, Iranian-backed militias can stop their own violent acts.
Both arguments miss the point. It is true that the attack on the Iranian navy in 1988 forced the country to reduce its attacks on oil tankers (and to stop targeting the Americans altogether). But the Iran of 1988 was exhausted by a ruinous eight-year war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and bereft of strong allies. There was nothing to do but retreat. Today's Iran, on the other hand, has a powerful network of proxies and some degree of support from both Russia and China. A round of U.S. strikes could make the country even more likely to use these proxies — and perhaps seek a nuclear bomb as insurance against future attacks.
Regarding the Gaza war, many Iranian allies cite the conflict as justification for their actions. But history did not begin on October 7. Militias in Syria and Iraq have carried out dozens of attacks on American troops over the past decade. The Houthis also have a history of attacking shipping; the war is just an excuse to escalate what they were already doing.
America's struggle to deter Iran stems from deeper contradictions in its Middle East policy, namely its desire to turn away from the region while still keeping troops in it, leaving a military presence large enough to sustain a military presence. menu of targets, but too small to actually contain Iran. .
This reverse Goldilocks arrangement had deadly consequences on January 28. The drone strike in Jordan hit an outpost known as Tower 22, a logistics hub for nearby al-Tanf, a remote US garrison in Syria. Founded during the campaign against Islamic State, no one can quite explain why al-Tanf still exists. U.S. officials cite a range of missions, but in practice they mostly serve as a bull's-eye for Iranian-backed groups when they want to lash out at America.
The Iranian regime views its allies as essential to its survival: they are waging a long war of attrition to drive US forces out of the Middle East and hinder Israel and US allies in the Gulf. Deterrence can only work if that perception changes.
Perhaps Iran could be deterred from using its proxies if it thought America was willing to overthrow its regime. But after two decades of failed American adventures in the Middle East, neither the Americans nor the Iranians believe this is on the cards.
America's allies in the region don't believe it either. Ten years ago, Israel and some Gulf states would have welcomed US attacks on Iranian allies. Then, as now, the region was ablaze: Iran helped Bashar al-Assad turn Syria into a charnel house, and the Houthis swept down from their northern redoubts to take control of most of Yemen's population centers. A sustained campaign of American strikes could have changed the course of the civil wars in both countries.
Today, however, these wars have effectively been settled – in favor of Iran's allies. The regime has its roots deep in four Arab countries. A few scattered flights won't dislodge it. That is why Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tried to improve their relations with Iran: if America cannot protect its partners, they see détente through diplomatic engagement and economic incentives as a safer alternative.
In a briefing with reporters after the attacks in Syria and Iraq, U.S. officials talked not about deterrence but about trying to “degrade” the capabilities of Iranian-backed groups. That might be more realistic: if America blows up enough Houthi anti-ship missiles, they will have to stop firing (at least until Iran can supply more).
But that would require a protracted campaign of the kind that Mr. Biden may want to avoid, which gets back to the heart of the problem. In the Middle East, America is torn between leaving and staying, unable to decide what to do with the forces it still has in the region. The status quo is not working – and paradoxically, it is Iran that has prevented America from changing it.
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