The first was the recognition, brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic, that Europe had become dependent on China for a wide range of goods. After decades of deliberately pursuing comparative advantage by moving industries, including polluting industries, beyond its borders, Europe had to face hard facts. Distance may no longer matter, but geopolitics does. And a product that is not strategic can quickly become so if a crisis breaks out, if production or trade is disrupted, or if a single producer gains monopoly power.
But the pandemic, with its shortages of common, critical goods like masks and chemical reagents, was just the beginning. The stakes have risen significantly since then, as China has a virtual monopoly on the production and/or refining of raw materials essential for the clean energy transition. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this challenge. Both vigilance and political caution will be needed.
The second political realization came after Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine. While China did not strictly support Russia's actions – and thus avoided exposure to the diplomatic and economic costs Russia has incurred, especially through sanctions – it also refused to push back against the Kremlin, hoping that the war would end the United States States would weaken. States and NATO. Having adopted a zero-sum mentality, China's leaders assumed that such weakening would automatically benefit China, just as anything that harms China benefits the West.
As Russia struggles to achieve its objectives in Ukraine, China's hopes for a major blow to the West are likely to diminish; the main goal now is to limit exposure to the ongoing conflict. Yet China's leaders recognize that Russia is virtually becoming a puppet state, giving China greater strategic depth and allowing it to extract economic benefits, such as favorable energy deals, from the Kremlin.
China wants Russia to survive economically, albeit just above the waterline. But the tacit support that China has offered Russia has been enough to seriously damage its relationship with the European Union, which has always seen through China's facade of neutrality. Although China has never crossed the “red line” that would add it to the list of countries deliberately violating Western sanctions, it has expanded its commercial ties with Russia (although it is far from alone).
The third realization that brought China to the forefront of European foreign policy came from the country's intensifying competition with the US. Europe is walking a fine line on this point. Of course, the country cannot be completely neutral and equidistant between the two powers when it comes to issues such as Taiwan, human rights or conflicts in the South China Sea. But Europe cannot give up its room for maneuver either, especially given the scope of US sanctions and the impact of the rivalry on virtually all global issues.
For Europe, Sino-American competition is not the driving force behind any global trend or development, let alone justifying any action or response. That is why the EU has repeatedly assured China that it is not prepared to take a confrontational approach. Europe is willing to recognize and accept China's systemic importance, and has no desire to block its rise or engage in strategic competition with China.
Against this background, Europe has made no effort to clarify its position on Taiwan, which is based both on non-recognition of the island's independence and on opposition to the use of force (including provocation or coercion) to change its status quo to change. The EU is willing to maintain and develop multi-faceted ties with Taiwan, as long as they do not imply recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty.
At the same time, the EU has remained steadfast in its assertion of systemic rivalry with China. While China insists its only rival is the US, Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, explained to Chinese leaders in Beijing in October that China and Europe disagree on several key issues and, fundamental, about values.
By establishing the primacy of economic growth and eschewing civil and political rights, China aims to challenge the European view of rights as universal, essential and inalienable. And a lot of work has been done to get the countries of the South on side. This clash of visions is shaping some of today's most consequential debates, not least over global standards for digital technology and artificial intelligence.
Another political message that the EU would like to send to China is that the favorable conditions under which Chinese companies gain access to the European market are not guaranteed. European companies are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with their Chinese counterparts, and not just because of their own shortcomings. China offers huge subsidies to its companies, while erecting high barriers to entry – both regulatory and informal, national and regional – for foreign companies. As China seeks to expand its footprint in industries that Europe has traditionally dominated, such as automotive and chemicals, this imbalance is becoming even more serious. Unless China changes course, Europe may have to take measures to protect domestic industries.
Europe is already pursuing a risk reduction strategy that involves the diversification of its supply chains, especially in strategically important sectors. But as it has tried to communicate with China, this is a practical step, not an ideological step. The EU is merely trying to limit the risks associated with excessive dependence on one source. Reducing risk is a shield, not a banner.
Ultimately, the EU is committed to maintaining a high level of cooperation with China. There is no denying that China is a systemically important country with a huge market, or that many developing countries view the country as a valuable political and economic counterweight to the West. It must be included in any effort to address global issues such as climate change, debt sustainability and public health. Even regional challenges, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, require cooperation with China.
Over the past three years, Europe has been forced to abandon its geopolitical naivety and recognize that normative power is no longer sufficient to exert strategic influence, and that multilateralism is giving way to transactional logic. If the EU is to thrive in a tougher, more conflict-ridden world, striking the right balance in its relations with China is essential. But that does not mean that Europe has already done so. Far from it.
Zaki Laïdi is a professor at Sciences Po and senior advisor to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
©2023/PROJECT SYNDICATE
www.project-syndicate.org