Three years of pandemic and then war in Ukraine have contributed to the realignment of the European project. This includes shifting the balance of who matters. Defense and eastward expansion, once dormant policy areas, are now priorities, giving a new voice to Ukraine's neighbors in Central Europe. The rise of China and the prospect of a resurgence of Trumpism in America have caused the EU to rethink its economic arrangements – often along constitutional-French lines. Climate imperatives have reinforced the value of taking action at a collective level – an approach favored by the EU's quasi-federal institutions in Brussels. And from Finland to France, populists from the far right are gaining influence ahead of June's European Parliament elections.
Not so long ago, Angela Merkel was the undisputed leader of the continent. Her successor as German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has not taken up her mantle. Many looked to Emmanuel Macron to seize it, not least the French president himself. But he is facing an increasingly fraught political situation at home, which led to him firing his prime minister on January 8 in the hope of a restart. Unable to run for re-election in 2027, he exudes a confident demeanor that often irritates his fellow EU leaders. Germany and France have unparalleled authority when they are on the same page. But that is rarely the case.
Without clear leadership, who matters today depends on what's at stake. Take defense and security, issues that are on everyone's minds, given the situation in Ukraine (and more recently the Middle East). After the Russian invasion in February 2022, few looked to Germany for guidance: the country had allowed itself to become addicted to Russian gas, and its armed forces were so unfit for purpose that Scholz declared the need for a Zeitenwende, a change in the spirit of the time. In contrast, the countries of Central Europe, led by Poland and the three Baltic states, felt vindicated after years of warning about the danger posed by Russia, their former overlord.
Their influence is visible in two policy shifts. One of these is that the EU itself pays for the shipment of weapons to Ukraine, a first step in defense spending. The second is enlargement, which was previously not on the agenda; No country has joined since Croatia in 2013. Now nine candidates are at various stages of discussions (see map). Most notable is Ukraine, whose cause was carried by Central Europe, despite initial reservations from France and Denmark; on December 14, EU leaders agreed to start formal accession negotiations. If and when the bloc expands to 36 countries – which will take years, if not decades – the center of gravity will shift decisively eastward.
. generally, Central Europeans now have sufficient power to push back on ideas emerging from the West. Chief among them is “strategic autonomy,” a shape-shifting concept put forward by Mr. Macron. This means that Europe must be able to act independently of others, for example by bearing a greater share of the burden of defending itself. Policymakers in Poland and Slovakia find that the security guarantees that NATO – and therefore America – offers are much more convincing. French calls for EU forces to buy European (i.e., often French) military equipment have been largely ignored .
But for all the influence that Central Europe has when it comes to Ukraine, its voice is hardly heard when it comes to other parts of European policymaking. (The moral authority built up in Warsaw and Bratislava by helping Ukraine was somewhat dented after they closed their borders to agricultural exports last April, which irritated leaders in Kiev.) Because when it comes to economic policy, Europe more and more thinking. French terms. At this point, Macron's loud call for strategic autonomy has proven much more powerful. Driven by a long-standing distrust of globalization – and new fears about supply chains that could be disrupted by pandemics or messy geopolitics – France wants the continent to become more self-sufficient. Tensions between America and China, as well as the prospect of a new Trump administration in 2025, have other Europeans listening.
Mr Macron has put forward the idea that Europe has been 'naive' in its dealings with the rest of the world, keeping its markets open while its trading partners have not (for example America with its protectionist green transition plan, or China with excessive subsidies EU rules banning national governments from coddling favorite industries were suspended during Covid-19 and never reversed. With the mantra of 'Europe first', politicians are now exerting more control over the shape of the economy. The French idea that Europe would pursue an industrial policy was once taboo, but now it is the accepted approach.
French dirigiste impulses prevailed as his ideas filled the vacuum left by Britain, which voted to leave the EU in 2016 and ultimately left the EU four years later. Had it remained a member of the club, it would have enthusiastically foiled the French plans. Now the task is left to the former Northern European allies, such as Denmark, Ireland or the Netherlands, and to the committee in Brussels. But that loose alliance can only weaken the French plans and not completely prevent them.
Britain is not the only one not at the top of the EU. A more surprising absentee is Germany: Mr Scholz is seen missing from the European scene. A fractious coalition with left-wing Greens and free-market liberals has reduced his ability to make deals in Brussels. “The German coalition moves more slowly than the debates within the EU,” a senior Brussels official criticizes. That cost her influence.
Germany's absence has often been France's gain. Many EU policy decisions today have a distinctly French flavor, for example the lack of major new trade deals (repulsive to French farmers) or a partial relaxation of European rules limiting budget deficits. But the lack of German involvement in particular hinders Macron's ambitions: federalist plans hatched in Paris will only really take off if their counterparts in Berlin agree to them. No one thinks the bad chemistry between the cold, northern Mr Scholz and the effervescent Europhile Mr Macron will improve any time soon.
Under other circumstances, France might have sought alliances that could have further shifted the balance of power. But there are few obvious places to look. Italy is led by Giorgia Meloni, whose far-right populism makes dealing with the mainstream difficult. The Netherlands is losing its long-standing Prime Minister Mark Rutte, perhaps in favor of Geert Wilders, an ideological ally of Ms Meloni. Spain's chaotic politics have limited its willingness to influence the European debate. Donald Tusk, recently returned to Poland, is liberal and pro-EU, but he has his work cut out for him at home.
Perhaps the biggest beneficiary of this vacuum is the EU's centralized institutions in Brussels. Under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, herself a German, the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, has amassed more power since 2019 than ever before. The 32,000-strong Brussels machine has long been a formidable regulatory force, as Silicon Valley barons have found out over the years. But it has also increasingly influenced political and geopolitical issues.
This started with Covid-19, when governments asked the commission to oversee vaccine procurement for the entire bloc. One outcome of the pandemic-induced downturn was Next Generation EU, a recovery fund of €807 billion in loans and grants. By taking charge of its operations, the commission has been able to direct the money in ways that fit its own priorities, for example plans to cut carbon emissions to zero by 2050 – an ambition that officials in Brussels are much more enthusiastic about There are then many national politicians, who have to defend the policy against voters who are afraid that the green agenda will further erode their purchasing power.
By having more discretion over EU money, the commission has been given new powers and can dictate to member states how the money should be spent. These powers can be used as a stick: Hungary and Poland have been deprived of money because they hinder domestic rule of law, for example the way courts are run. Viktor Orbán, Hungary's authoritarian leader, is calling for around 30 billion euros in suspended EU money. In Poland in the autumn, Mr Tusk campaigned in part on his ability to free up EU funds that had been blocked by his predecessor's policies.
Is this the sign of an emerging federal Europe, a European superstate in the making? It can feel that way for people like Hungary and Poland. But there are limits to the committee's powers. Part of Ms von der Leyen's influence comes from the fact that she works closely with national capitals, for example on sanctions against Russia. She can influence the debate, for example in Europe's attitude towards China, where she pushed for a 'risk-reducing' approach to trade, less confrontational than the 'decoupling' suggested by America. She is perhaps the closest thing we have to a European leader these days. But her power still depends on others following; she will have to convince national leaders to reappoint her for a second term after the European elections in June. And Brussels still spends little more than 1% of the bloc's total GDP.
Elections also have a way of changing the European order. Populists have done well in the Netherlands and Slovakia, not in Poland and Spain. They are expected to gain ground in the European Parliament elections. The most powerful force in post-war Europe – a weak consensus in favor of liberal values and the rule of law – may be under threat.
Once the Euro elections are over, attention will turn to America, still the main guarantor of European security and a major contributor to Ukraine's war effort. A Trump victory would be greeted with widespread horror. That vote throwing an ocean away from Paris, Berlin or Warsaw will be so important for the future of Europe and will certainly trigger arguments that the architecture of power there still has much to develop.
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